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The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, so named 
because it was launched in the Qatari capital, is in deep trouble. 
Negotiators have yet to meet any of the interim deadlines for 
completing the talks, and they missed another at the end of April 
2006. While it is still possible to finish the round by early 2007, 
the odds are diminishing by the day, and this deadline matters 
more than most. Trade promotion authority (TPA) in the United 
States will expire in June 2007, and if the round does not make 
significant progress before then, TPA might not be renewed, and 
the round would likely drag on for several more years.
Agriculture  is  the  key  to  untangling  the  knot  strangling 
the trade talks, as it was in the last multilateral negotiation. But 
this round, formally called the Doha Development Agenda, is 
also supposed to focus on the needs and interests of develop-
.  Under TPA, the US Congress agrees to vote on eligible trade agreements up 
or down, without amendment and within certain deadlines. Without TPA, US 
negotiators would find it more difficult to make credible commitments to reduce 
trade barriers because Congress could amend agreements to delete provisions 
it did not like. For a review of likely scenarios for the round, see Hufbauer and 
Schott (2006).
ing countries, and disagreements over what this focus means are 
contributing to the impasse. Developing-country governments 
have been holding back formal liberalization offers on nonagri-
cultural market access and services until industrialized-country 
negotiators improve their offers on agriculture. Some develop-
ment-focused nongovernmental organizations and analysts are 
also encouraging developing countries to hold out for better 
offers. Oxfam International, for example, recently stated that 
“unless offers change significantly in the next three months, poor 
countries would be better off continuing to negotiate, rather 
than signing a deal this year.”2 Timothy A. Wise and Kevin P. 
Gallagher (2006) are of a similar opinion: “As the Doha negotia-
tions limp toward an ill-defined finish line, it is not surprising 
that many developing-country negotiators are asking themselves 
if the emerging deal is better than no deal at all.”  
In contrast, this policy brief argues that developing coun-
tries, especially the poorest, have the most at risk if the Doha 
Round is not wrapped up this year. It also challenges the conven-
tional wisdom that agricultural liberalization by rich countries 
is the key to making this round a development round. A deal 
on  agriculture  is  critical  to  the  round’s  success  because  high 
tariffs and subsidies in that sector are essentially what the rich 
countries have left to contribute to a reciprocal trade bargain. 
But many developing countries are more interested in access for 
labor-intensive manufactured goods, such as clothing. And far 
more than just access is needed to ensure that poorer countries, 
and poor farmers within them, can take advantage of any new 
market opportunities that emerge.
Who Wins and Loses?
Recent estimates of the potential gains from free trade are lower 
than previous estimates, and plausible Doha Round scenarios 
produce modest gains at best. Moreover, the gains from free 
trade are not evenly distributed, and the models show that some 
countries could suffer net losses from trade liberalization. It is 
important to understand why more recent calculations are lower, 
2.  Oxfam International, press release, “Oxfam Report Warns Poor Countries 
Against Signing Bad Trade Deal,” April 27, 2006, available at www.oxfam.org.NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 5    J U N E   2 0 0 6
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why many studies underestimate the potential gains, and why 
some countries could lose.
Are the Gains from Free Trade Lower 
than Previously Believed?
The short answer is yes but not for the reasons that people 
often  think.  The  economists  producing  reports  that  show 
lower gains than in previous studies have not concluded that 
the benefits from a given amount of trade liberalization are 
lower than previously thought. Rather, the decline in project-
ed gains across otherwise comparable studies is due mainly to 
a reduction in the measured level of remaining trade barri-
ers. Antoine Bouet (2006) surveys a number of recent stud-
ies that use computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
to estimate the gains from trade and explores the differences 
in assumptions and behavioral parameters that contribute to 
differences in results.
    Two World Bank studies have attracted particular attention 
because the later one finds the gains from global free trade to 
be $00 billion lower than the earlier study, even though they 
use the same model and make similar assumptions (Anderson, 
Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2006; World Bank 2002). 
The principal reason for the difference in the World Bank 
results is that the baseline level of protection to which the free 
trade scenario is compared is lower than before. The change in 
the baseline results from both the inclusion of recent episodes 
of trade liberalization and improvements in the measure of 
protection used in most CGE models. The baseline reflects the 
phaseout of textile and apparel quotas after 2004, implemen-
tation of other Uruguay Round commitments, and China’s
.   In studies using the same basic data and baseline level of protection, Bouet 
(2006) finds that that the key sources of differences in results derive from 
different assumptions about how demand and supply respond to changes in 
prices (especially the so-called Armington elasticities) and whether productiv-
ity effects are included.
accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO).4  In 
addtion,  scholars  at  the  Centre  d’Etudes  Prospectives  et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris invested 
considerable effort to incorporate in the new MacMaps data-
base lower, preferential tariff rates applied by rich countries 
to  eligible  developing-country  exports.  Most  trade  model-
ers, including Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2006), now use this new database.  
Are the Potential Gains Being Underestimated?
Estimates of the gains to developing countries from global 
free trade generally fall in a range from $0 billion to $90 
billion, roughly comparable to global aid flows in recent years. 
Estimated gains from various Doha Round scenarios are obvi-
ously smaller than those from completely free trade, especially 
those scenarios that try to replicate realistic scenarios based on 
the relatively modest offers currently on the table. But most 
developing countries do still gain, and recent studies show 
that they gain more as a share of national income than do rich 
countries. Some of these studies also suggest specific ways that 
offers could be improved to benefit developing countries.
For example, a new analysis by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates the gains from a 
scenario based on what is currently being discussed in Geneva 
and what observers believe is likely to emerge (Bouet, Mevel, 
and Orden 2006). While the gains are small, consistent with 
the apparently low level of ambition in Geneva, developing 
countries gain nearly twice as much as rich ones: 0.2 percent 
of  real  income  for  middle-income  countries,  0.7  percent 
for low-income countries, and 0.0 percent for high-income 
countries.
Moreover,  the  analysis  shows  that  the  gains  for  least-
developed countries (LDCs) could be substantially enhanced 
if rich countries offered free access for LDC exports. At the 
WTO ministerial in Hong Kong in December 200, member 
countries agreed that LDCs should receive duty- and quota-
free  treatment  for  their  exports  under  at  least  97  percent 
of tariff lines. According to the IFPRI study, in the central 
(realistic) scenario, going to 00 percent of tariff lines would 
raise the projected gains for LDCs from $ billion to over $8 
billion! The analysis also shows that allowing rich countries 
. When adjusted for differences in model structure, the new World Bank 
figures are about $00 billion lower than William Cline’s (2004) estimate of 
the gains from global free trade, probably due to similar differences in data and 
baseline scenarios to those in the two World Bank studies mentioned above.
.  Information on the new database is available at the CEPII Web site, www.
cepii.fr.
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to exempt as sensitive just  percent of agricultural products 
reduces the potential global gains by a third, from $82 billion 
to $ billion, as estimated in the central scenario.
These estimates of the gains could well be underestimates. 
By  necessity,  the  CGE  models  used  to  estimate  the  gains 
from trade make a number of simplifying assumptions, and 
some things are left out because of difficulties in measuring 
them. Most recent analyses use the new MacMaps database 
that includes preferential tariff schemes, which allow develop-
ing countries to export eligible products to rich countries at 
lower-than-normal tariff rates. Studies that use this database 
likely obtain underestimates of the potential gains because they 
assume that developing countries fully use these preferences, 
when in fact restrictive rules of origin and other administra-
tive barriers often prevent them from doing so. In addition, 
most models do not incorporate the benefits of services trade 
liberalization because of data deficiencies and difficulties in 
measuring barriers. Also, many economists believe that the 
greatest gains from increased trade come when it stimulates 
higher rates of productivity growth. But modeling of these 
gains is less developed, and they are difficult to measure, and 
many studies do not estimate them.6
Why Do Some Countries Lose?
Recent  studies  underscore  the  heterogeneity  of  developing 
countries and the unequal distribution of potential gains and 
losses. In particular, free trade could result in (small) net losses 
for two groups of countries: those that have preferential access 
to  rich-country  markets,  especially  for  certain  agricultural 
products and textiles and apparel, and those that are net food 
importers.
Preference  erosion  occurs  when  most  favored  nation 
(MFN) tariffs applied to most countries are reduced, thereby 
resulting in a smaller gap between the MFN and preferen-
tial tariff rates granted to eligible developing countries. The 
reduction in MFN tariffs reduces the competitive advantage 
that developing countries gain from preferential access and 
could  result  in  lower  market  shares  and  export  prices  for 
6.  Cline (2004) and Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) 
estimate that the gains from global free trade would be 0 and 60 percent 
higher, respectively, if trade contributes to higher productivity growth.
them. This is especially the case for LDCs, which often receive 
more generous preferences than other developing countries.7 
At the same time, lower agricultural tariffs and subsidies tend 
to lower domestic prices, production, and exports and could 
raise world prices for agricultural products, which could lead 
to higher food import bills for net food-importing countries. 
These two so-called terms-of-trade effects explain the losses 
suffered by Mexico, Bangladesh, some countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
But the projected losses may be exaggerated for several 
reasons. As noted above, the MacMaps database used in recent 
studies  assumes  that  developing  countries  fully  utilize  the 
preferences for which they are eligible, but most countries are 
unlikely to do so. The models also ignore the economic distor-
tions that preferential arrangements introduce. For example, 
many Caribbean nations import sugar to meet domestic needs 
and export domestic production to the European Union or 
the United States in order to sell it at a price as much as two 
to three times higher than world prices. A direct transfer of 
financial  resources  would  be  far  more  efficient  and  would 
allow exporting countries to reallocate resources to products 
in which they have a comparative advantage. It would also 
avoid the losses to developing countries that do not receive 
preferences  and  would  allow  them  to  reap  the  gains  from 
multilateral liberalization. These models also show that the 
food price increases resulting from liberalization are likely to 
be quite modest, and the liberalization will be phased in over a 
number of years, further mitigating any impact. Trade liberal-
ization is also unlikely to reverse the long-standing downward 
trend in agricultural commodity prices.
In addition, most of the scenarios showing losses for a 
number of countries are those involving partial liberalization 
under projections of what a Doha Round agreement might 
look like. Since it has been agreed that LDCs will not be asked 
to undertake liberalization commitments, the terms-of-trade 
losses described above dominate the results for these countries. 
These countries reap none of the potential benefits from doing 
trade reform themselves, which could offset the terms-of-trade 
losses. In general, scenarios based on more ambitious liberali-
zation, including by the LDCs, tend to show greater gains and 
smaller losses for most countries.
7.  The European Union provides duty- and quota-free access for imports 
from LDCs, except for sugar, bananas, and rice, which are being phased in 
under the Everything But Arms program. The United States provides mostly 
free access regionally, for countries in the Andean and Caribbean areas of the 
Americas and for African countries under the Africa Growth and Opportunity 
Act; non-African LDCs and other developing countries receive only the 
regular Generalized System of Preferences benefits, which exclude many 
agricultural products, textiles and apparel, and other labor-intensive sensitive 
products.  Both the European Union and the United States have strict rules of 
origin and other administrative requirements, which lead to underutilization 
of these preferences.
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A recent Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
study has attracted a great deal of attention (Polaski 2006). 
Contrary to how it is frequently interpreted, this study finds 
roughly the same overall level of gains as other models do, with 
the share accruing to developing countries being substantially 
higher than in most other studies. The Carnegie study also 
finds that there are losers from trade liberalization, and while 
much has been made of this finding, it does not differ from 
most other studies and is rooted in the terms-of-trade effects 
described above. Nor does a scenario in which all developing 
countries are allowed to exempt all agricultural products from 
tariffs or subsidy cuts change the basic results—industrialized 
countries  do  not  lose  much  from  granting  this  additional 
flexibility, but neither do developing countries gain much. As 
discussed in greater detail below, the negotiating framework 
already provides a great deal of flexibility in agriculture for 
developing countries. Granting even more flexibility would 
likely render the agreement politically unacceptable in export-
ing countries.
evaLuating the offers on the tabLe
Many critics argue that what the rich countries were offer-
ing on agriculture in early summer 2006, and demanding in 
return, would actually leave developing countries worse off. 
The outlines of a possible deal at the time of this writing suggest 
that the outcome will indeed be modest but that it would 
provide worthwhile benefits to developing countries. Areas of 
convergence and divergence on agriculture are summarized in 
table , and some of the key issues are discussed below.
On  nonagricultural  market  access,  negotiators  appear 
to be converging on a “Swiss formula” coefficient of around 
0 for developed countries, which would force steep cuts in 
tariff peaks on labor-intensive products, such as textiles and 
apparel and footwear, and ensure that no manufacturing tariff 
remains  above  0  percent.8  The  coefficient  for  developing 
countries and how much flexibility they will have to depart 
from formula cuts are the major issues still under discussion. 
Services negotiations are lagging badly, and it is unclear what 
might emerge there.
Is Elimination of Export Subsidies Trivial?
The value of the remaining export subsidies, $2 billion to $ 
billion annually, spent mainly by the European Union, under-
states the significance of its commitment to phase them out 
8.  The Swiss formula approach leads to greater harmonization in tariff struc-
tures because it reduces higher tariffs more than lower ones and sets a ceiling 
(the coefficient value) for all tariffs.
by 20. This deadline is later than many countries would 
have preferred. But the true significance lies in the fact that, 
combined with increased openness to imports, the European 
Union will no longer be able to dump surpluses on world 
markets, which will also keep the pressure on to continue 
reducing price supports for domestic production.
Are the Domestic Subsidy Proposals Meaningless?
The negotiations appear to be converging toward an agreement 
that would reduce the most trade-distorting forms of domestic 
support by 70 percent or so in the European Union and 60 
percent in the United States and Japan. This reduction would 
probably not reduce EU spending beyond what it is commit-
ted to do under recent reforms of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, but it would lock in those reforms. It would also limit 
the extent to which US policymakers could bail out farmers 
when prices drop, which would reduce price suppression and 
lower  price  volatility.  How  great  the  constraints  would  be 
depends on how any agreement is implemented, and further 
clarification of the rules is needed to prevent manipulation, 
which would minimize the impact. 9
Is There Any Hope for Meaningful Market Access? 
The least progress to date has been made on market access in 
the European Union and other rich-country markets. Nego-
tiators appear to be converging on a formula that would cut 
average rich-country tariffs by roughly 0 percent. This aver-
age cut will be whittled down, however, through the various 
demands for flexibility to depart from the formula cut. Still, 
agreement on a framework that includes tiered tariff cuts, with 
higher cuts on higher tariffs, a tariff cap, and expansion of 
tariff-rate quotas (which have a lower tariff on imports up to a 
set level and then a higher tariff for overquota imports), would 
embed important principles in the trade rules. The new rules 
would help to reduce tariff escalation, which often prevents 
developing countries from adding value to primary commod-
9.   It is harder to assess the effect of the proposed cuts on US subsidies because 
they fluctuate with prices.  In addition, because of oddities in how the WTO 
measures domestic support,  the impact on actual US spending on the major 
crops—corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, and rice—would depend on what hap-
pens to the sugar and dairy programs.  If US policymakers decide to eliminate 
the official price floors for these products and rely purely on tariff-rate quotas 
to support domestic prices, it would free up more than $ billion, which could 
be allocated to the ceilings for other products.  Japan did something similar a 
few years ago on rice and reduced its officially reported “amber box” spending 
by nearly 80 percent.  In the US case, removing sugar and dairy from the amber 
box would mean that a 60 percent cut would force only modest reductions in 
other subsidies in bad years and would have no impact in good ones, when 
prices are high.NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 5                                                                                                                                                                                               J U N E   2 0 0 6
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Table 1 Key issues on agriculture in the Doha Round negotiations, as of mid-June 2006
Issue Emerging consensus? Continued divergence
Export competition Export subsidies, both direct and indirect (related 
to food aid, export credits, and STEs) will be 
eliminated in 01.
Export credits for terms of greater than 180 days 
will not be allowed, and these programs will be 
self-financing.
Government financing of STEs will be eliminated.
In-kind food aid will be allowed under certain 
circumstances in emergencies.
EU agreement on direct export subsidy 
elimination remains conditional on reaching 
agreement on “parallel” forms of subsidy.
Over what period should export credit programs 
be self-financing (proposals range from 1 to 1 
years)?
Whether the monopoly powers of STEs should be 
eliminated.
Whether nonemergency in-kind food aid should 
be allowed and under what conditions; whether 
“monetization” of in-kind food aid should be 
allowed; whether food aid should be in grant-
form only.
Domestic support An overall level of trade-distorting support, 
including AMS, amber box de minimis, and blue 
box, will be calculated and cut.
Developed countries with higher levels of support 
will have to make larger cuts in the most trade-
distorting forms of support (the amber box AMS), 
with the European Union making cuts of at least 
70 percent, the United States and Japan making 
cuts of at least 60 percent, and all others making 
lesser cuts.
Product-specific caps will be calculated for the 
AMS.
Allowable de minimis payments in the amber 
box will be reduced by at least half, to no more 
than . percent of the value of production for 
developed countries and  percent for developing 
countries.
The blue box for moderately distorting subsidies 
will be capped at  percent of production in some 
historical period and perhaps cut to . percent.
The blue box will be redefined to accommodate 
US CCPs.
The exact numbers for caps and cuts.
How to calculate product-specific caps, what base 
period to use?
What base period to use for the value of 
production in setting the caps for de minimis and 
whether to further cut it to 1 percent of the value 
of production.
How quickly the blue box might be cut to . 
percent of production and whether additional 
cuts are possible.
Additional disciplines on US blue box allocations 
to ensure CCPs are less trade-distorting than 
amber box subsidies, for example, calculating 
product-specific caps.
Disciplines to ensure that green box payments 
actually have minimal effects on trade.
(table continues next page)NU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 5    J U N E   2 0 0 6
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ity exports, and would ensure at least modest increased access 
for  sensitive  products.  The  key  to  how  much  additional 
access is created depends on how many sensitive products 
are exempted, how those products are treated, for example, 
whether the tariff cap will apply to them, and whether the 
special safeguard for agricultural products is retained for rich 
countries.
Would Rich-Country Demands Impinge 
on Developing-Country “Policy Space”?
Under plausible scenarios, developing countries are more like-
ly to be given too much flexibility, than too little, especially 
in agriculture. LDCs are not being asked to undertake any 
liberalization commitments, and other developing countries 
will make lesser cuts in tariffs and subsidies than what the 
rich countries agree to do. Under plausible scenarios, these 
cuts would have modest effects on levels of protection because 
the rates that developing countries agreed to legally bind in 
past negotiations are generally well above the rates applied in 
practice. Moreover, in agriculture, developing countries will 
be able to designate special, as well as sensitive, products and 
will also have access to a special safeguards mechanism that 
will allow them to raise tariffs in the face of import surges. 
The idea behind policy space in general is to give develop-
ing countries the space to adopt infant-industry and other 
industrial policies to help them develop economically and, in 
agriculture, to protect subsistence farmers from import surges. 
Such loose disciplines in many developing countries are likely 
to  perpetuate  uncoordinated  and  costly  protection  against 
imports, driven primarily by corrupt insiders, to the detriment 
of poor consumers.
agricuLture and the doha round
Whatever the rhetoric, agriculture is at the center of the Doha 
Development Agenda, primarily because it is the sector with 
the highest remaining barriers in rich countries. Developed-
Table 1 (continued)
Issue Emerging consensus? Continued divergence
Market access Use of four tiers with larger cuts for higher tariffs, 
perhaps ranging from  to 7 percent for the 
developed countries as proposed by the G-0; 
probably two-thirds less for developing countries.
Overall, an average cut in the tariff of roughly 
0 percent for developed countries (before 
exceptions).
Cap tariffs, perhaps at around 100 percent 
for developed countries and 10 percent for 
developing countries.
Countries will be allowed to depart from formula 
cuts for “sensitive products,” as well as special 
products in developing countries.
A special safeguard mechanism will be created 
for developing countries, using both price and 
volume triggers.
Least-developed countries will not have to 
undertake any tariff cuts.
Whether tariff cap will apply to sensitive products.
How many sensitive products to allow, with offers 
ranging from 1 percent of tariff lines (G-10) to 
8 percent (European Union) to 1 percent (United 
States, G-0), with 1. percent for developing 
countries.
Whether to use domestic consumption or imports 
as the base for expanding market access for 
sensitive products under tariff-rate quotas.
How to address tariff escalation, beyond the 
tiered cuts and tariff cap.
Whether to retain the special safeguard 
mechanism for developed countries.
AMS = aggregate measurement of support
CCPs = countercyclical payments
G-10 = Group of 10 mostly developed countries with defensive interests on agriculture
G-0 = Group of 0 developing countries with offensive interests on agriculture
STEs = state trading enterprisesNU M B E R  P B 0 6 - 5                                                                                                                                                                                               J U N E   2 0 0 6
7
country markets are mostly open to manufactured goods (with 
the important exception of textiles and apparel), and agricul-
tural liberalization is the main thing rich countries can put on 
the table. Many developing countries also have a comparative 
advantage in agriculture, and the formation of the Group of 
20 (G-20), led by Brazil, India, and South Africa, has given 
the talks a more pronounced North-South flavor than in past 
rounds. But not just developing countries are pushing for farm 
policy  reform.  US  agricultural  exporters  have  traditionally 
been an important part of the pro–free trade coalition, and 
they will accept reduced subsidies only if they get increased 
market access abroad. A successful conclusion to the Doha 
Round is thus unlikely without a deal on agriculture.
But a deal on agriculture is not enough to deliver on 
Doha’s promise to promote development in poor countries. 
Most trade models show that agriculture accounts for half or 
more of the gains to be reaped from global free trade. But 
the share is smaller in most Doha scenarios because of the 
assumption  that  rich  countries  will  continue  to  insist  on 
extensive exemptions. Moreover, most of those gains accrue 
to consumers and taxpayers in the rich countries with the 
highest barriers. For many countries outside Latin America, 
manufacturing liberalization, especially reductions in tariffs 
on textiles, apparel, footwear, and other labor-intensive light 
manufactures, is more important than agriculture. But agri-
cultural trade is important for sub-Saharan Africa—an impor-
tant  caveat  from  the  perspective  of  those  concerned  about 
poverty. While the numbers are small, World Bank scenarios 
of possible outcomes from the Doha Round suggest that sub-
Saharan Africa could gain more from meaningful agricultural 
liberalization, as a share of national income, than any develop-
ing region outside Latin America (Anderson, Martin, and van 
der Mensbrugghe 2006).
In sum, agriculture is where the greatest potential global 
gains are. And rural development—connecting the poor to 
markets—can be important to ensuring that growth benefits 
the poor as development takes place. But agriculture is not 
the key for every developing country, and when it is impor-
tant, market access alone is often not enough. Many rural 
poor live in remote areas that are isolated from national and 
international markets, and agricultural liberalization in rich 
countries might have little or no effect on them in the absence 
of  complementary  policies  to  address  supply  constraints. 
Developing-country  governments  and  international  donors 
thus also have to create an environment in which the poor can 
grasp new trade opportunities. This is what makes a meaning-
ful aid-for-trade package so important.
the risks of deLay
Insufficient political will certainly would delay the completion 
of the Doha Round. But in crafting a negotiating strategy for 
the short run, developing countries need to weigh the risks of 
delay carefully. Whether European and American concessions 
on agriculture are more likely after the French presidential 
elections in April 2007 and the US congressional elections in 
fall 2006 depend on the outcome of those elections and are not 
guaranteed. Moreover, if the negotiations make little progress 
over the next several months, the probability of renewing TPA 
in 2007 will be low, regardless of what happens in fall 2006. 
And if TPA is not renewed, then the negotiations are likely to 
languish at least until after the 2008 US presidential election.
The danger lies in what could happen in the interim. 
In the United States, Congress will have to pass legislation 
authorizing farm programs, perhaps for the next five years. 
Without the pressure of conforming to a Doha Round agree-
ment,  Congress  might  choose  to  simply  extend  existing 
legislation, with all the trade-distorting subsidies. An oppor-
tunity to further reform farm policy in the European Union in 
2008 could also be lost. Litigation might result in additional 
successful rulings, but it carries the risk of a political backlash 
against WTO meddling. If that backlash is strong enough, it 
could imperil farm-sector support for renewal of Doha Round 
negotiations down the road.
At the same time, trade negotiators in key countries are 
unlikely to wait for the multilateral talks to resume, and the 
recent trend toward bilateral and regional negotiations will 
accelerate. This would hurt the smallest and poorest countries 
the most, since they are often excluded from these arrange-
ments. Developing countries negotiating with larger, richer 
industrialized countries would also lose the negotiating lever-
age that they gain from negotiating as a group in the multi-
lateral context. Proposals of particular interest to developing 
Agriculture is not the key for 
every developing country, and 
when it is important, market 
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countries, including aid for trade and duty- and quota-free 
treatment for LDCs, might also be pulled off the table.
Clearly  the  offers  circulating  in  Geneva  need  to  be 
improved before a bargain can be struck. US negotiators will 
have to improve their offer on domestic agricultural support, 
in particular by agreeing to disciplines that ensure some cuts 
in actual spending. The European Union has to improve its 
market access offer, by accepting both larger cuts and fewer 
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